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U.S. MARITIME STR ATEGY IN THE ARC TIC
Past, Present, and Future
James G. Foggo III and Rachael Gosnell

May I be allowed to wish the rising generation of American naval officers all success in
the noble profession they are entering, and to express a hope that America, and especially
the American Navy, will maintain the place she has won in the front rank of Arctic
explorers.

T

LIEUTENANT JOHN W. DANENHOWER, “THE POLAR QUESTION,” 1885

he U.S. Navy has an enduring legacy in the Arctic. From the earliest days
of the United States as an Arctic nation following the purchase of Alaska in
1867, our Navy has patrolled the region to protect national interests. As the area
becomes increasingly accessible to maritime traffic, the Arctic will form a crossroads where geopolitical, economic, climate, technological, and security trends
meet. As noted in a document published in January 2021 laying out an Arctic
strategy for the Navy, warming waters and the resultant melting sea ice will create
new challenges off our northern shores, and the Navy and Marine Corps must
be prepared.1 Aggressive Russian militarization and expanding Chinese interest
in the region are giving rise to greater strategic competition in the Arctic. An
American naval presence in the Arctic will ensure peace and prosperity.
Lessons from America’s Arctic past can illuminate what needs to be done to
help meet the demands of the Arctic of the future, ensuring integrated deterrence while also enabling adherence to the international rules and norms that
are the backbone of our global economy. The Navy has a robust history in the
region, dating back to the earliest American Arctic explorers. From USS Nautilus (SSN 571) onward, the Arctic has played an important role in U.S. Navy
operations. During the Cold War, Navy Secretary John F. Lehman Jr.’s Maritime
Strategy provided a forward-thinking approach that served to stretch the Soviet
navy.
The competitors of the future will present threats far more complex than
those the Navy faced previously, given the emergence and prevalence of
advanced technologies, the cyber and space domains, hybrid warfare, and
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increasingly bold state and nonstate actors. Our Navy must continue to look
northward to ensure regional stability and prevent competitors from dominating an increasingly blue (as opposed to white) Arctic. The international norms
that enable global economic prosperity—particularly freedom of the seas—increasingly are being challenged in the Arctic, setting a disquieting precedent for
other global hot spots.
But Arctic operations are challenging in themselves. Although the region is
warming and the ice cover is diminishing, operating in the polar environment
will continue to be arduous. Conditions of extreme cold, icing, frequent storms,
and near-complete darkness during parts of the year all serve to challenge mariners. Adding to these complexities, there are few deepwater ports and there is
limited infrastructure to support and sustain operations. Communications challenges, lack of adequate hydrographic surveys, and a paucity of airfield options
for search-and-rescue (SAR) and other emergency diversions increase risk to
those operating in the region.
Confronting these hostile operating conditions, the Navy is materially and
operationally underprepared now compared with during the Cold War. To help
the service regain lost proficiency—and send a clear message to any nation seeking to challenge international norms in the region—this article will reflect on
the Navy’s history to gain innovative insights into ensuring maritime superiority
in this challenging region. The article first will examine the service’s history in
the Arctic; next it will consider current geopolitics and naval operations; then
it will provide specific recommendations for ensuring the establishment and
continuation of American naval superiority in the evolving Arctic region.
LESSONS FROM THE PAST
The U.S. Navy is no stranger to the Arctic. The Navy Department administered
the newly acquired Department of Alaska from 1879 until the territory’s reorganization under civil administration in 1884. The Navy stationed the sloop
of war USS Jamestown in Sitka, Alaska, to “preserve order among the Indians
and to prevent threatened conflicts.”2 In an era of increasing exploration in the
Far North, naval officers were eager to improve their Arctic expertise. The first
article written in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings about the Arctic, a discussion on ice navigation by Lieutenant Frederick G. Schwatka, USA, appeared in
October 1880. Schwatka provided exceptional detail on the dangers posed by
“ice-packs, ice-floes, icebergs, tides, storms, currents, and other obstacles,” as well
as instructions for ships’ “care and preservation when securely anchored by the
cold clutches of the ice, for the long dreary winter night of the Arctic, [and] their
liberation when the summer’s sun has broken up the great ice fields.”3 Five years
later, Lieutenant John W. Danenhower, USN, provided a comprehensive account
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2022
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of Arctic exploration in Proceedings.4 This insightful piece discussed the difficult
conditions mariners faced in the High North and which maritime routes were to
be preferred in the region.
The Navy pioneered America’s earliest forays as an Arctic nation. The service’s
archives and histories document both the perils of operating in the Arctic and
how those challenges could be overcome. These were important topics for naval
officers seeking to defend and promote U.S. national interests in the northern
latitudes. Then-Commander Robert E. Peary Sr., USN, a Civil Engineer Corps
officer, became the first explorer to reach the North Pole, on 6 April 1909. His
motto—“I will find a way or make one!”—reflects his impressive resilience.5 He
dedicated years to understanding the Arctic’s weather patterns and ice conditions, often relying on the indigenous Inuits’ extensive knowledge and experience. Less than two decades later, on 9 May 1926, Lieutenant Commander
Richard E. Byrd Jr. navigated the first (although some dispute this) flight over the
North Pole, beating Norwegian explorer Roald Amundsen’s attempt by airship by
a few days. Byrd and the pilot, Floyd Bennett—who had served in the Navy previously—received the Congressional Medal of Honor for their intrepid expedition.
The flight would not have been possible had it not departed from Svalbard, in
Norway’s northernmost archipelago. This highlights the enduring importance of
international cooperation and the value of regional partnerships. The Arctic long
has fostered international interest and unique levels of cooperation. U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing discussed the “perplexing situation” encompassing
the Spitsbergen (later called Svalbard) Archipelago—from which Byrd, Amundsen, and many other Arctic explorers launched their expeditions—in a 1917
article in the American Journal of International Law, “A Unique International
Problem.” He noted that Spitsbergen’s sovereignty question arose “as a result of
American enterprise and energy, which, overcoming Arctic ice and barrenness,
proved to the world the wealth of the islands.”6 Lansing was referring to the successful Svalbard operations of the Arctic Coal Company, a U.S. mining company
that later was purchased by a Norwegian concern. The secretary’s efforts to forge
a resolution to Spitsbergen’s status while a member of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace and his participation at the 1919–20 peace conference at
Versailles reflected American economic and political interests in the archipelago
and the Arctic access it provided. In 1920, global leaders gathered in Paris to sign
the Spitsbergen (Svalbard) Treaty, which recognized Norway’s sovereignty over
the archipelago but stipulated that all signatories—fourteen originally, now fortysix—had equal rights to engage in commercial and research activities there. The
archipelago was declared a visa-free zone and naval bases were prohibited, as was
any use of Svalbard for warlike purposes. President Woodrow Wilson endorsed
the treaty and the Senate ratified it in 1924.7
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss3/4
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Although many at first had called America’s 1867 purchase of Alaska “Seward’s
Folly” (it was spearheaded by U.S. Secretary of State William H. Seward), the
Arctic territory’s economic potential became clear during the 1896–99 gold
rush, and its strategic importance became clear during the lead-up to World War
II. In 1935, General William L. “Billy” Mitchell, USAAC, declared to Congress
that “he who holds Alaska will hold the world”; he famously proclaimed that
Alaska was the “most strategic place in the world.” With his views colored by
his assignment to Alaska as a
U.S. strategic interests in the Arctic—including junior officer, Mitchell urged
economic, military, and geopolitical—will in- the construction of military
crease as regional activity rises. The U.S. Navy bases to enable a northern air
defense. This argument later
must be prepared.
became more urgent during
the Cold War, since the shortest and most likely route that Soviet bombers or
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) would take to attack the United States
lay across the Arctic.
The Soviet government, meanwhile, was developing Arctic navigation and
aviation capabilities. The Soviets opened the Northern Sea Route in the early
1930s as a means to resupply isolated coastal communities. British journalist H.
P. Smolka noted in 1938 that “[o]nly in the last few months has the world begun
to be conscious of Russia’s energetic efforts to push open her frozen window in
the North and develop a Polar Empire.”8 Russian president Vladimir V. Putin’s
modern polar-great-power ambitions reflect Russia’s historical interest in the
region, but they are facilitated by a thawing Arctic.
At the time, Smolka also highlighted a perceived northern strength—one
that today’s Arctic thawing is diminishing. Relying on his extensive travels in
the region studying its geography and inhabitants, he assessed that in a potential
conflict Russia could be “bottled up” on three sides, but that the north was an
“independent, continuous and all-Russian coastline, unassailable by anyone.”9
Indeed, while World War II was devastating to the Soviet Union, the frozen north
did provide an unassailable border. Smolka had identified an important component relevant to Russia’s present-day strategy in the High North. Russia’s Arctic
border—the world’s longest national coastline—traditionally was considered
impenetrable to invasion, but now the opening of the Arctic heightens the sense
of paranoia that characterizes Russia’s views about potential invasions and has led
to increased militarization in the region.10
The 1920 Spitsbergen Treaty exemplified the spirit of international cooperation that has been a feature of the modern Arctic. Yet, not so long after it first
was signed, growing wariness of Germany and the Soviet Union motivated the
next round of Arctic diplomacy and military cooperation. The United States
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2022
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and Canada signed the Ogdensburg Agreement in August 1940 to provide for
closer defense cooperation against airborne threats emanating from the polar
region. Although devised even as another world war was engulfing the globe, it
established a Permanent Joint Board on Defense that was intended to outlive the
conflagration, which became important later as wariness of Soviet Communism
grew and the Cold War emerged.
In June 1942, the Japanese bombed U.S. bases at Dutch Harbor and Fort Mears
in Alaska and seized the Aleutian islands of Attu and Kiska, making the Aleutians
the only World War II battleground where U.S. soil suffered foreign occupation.
The Alaska Territory played an important role as a transfer site for executing
Lend-Lease Act programs designed to bring desperately needed food, oil, and
matériel to American allies during the war.11 The Allies used Arctic routes to
resupply the Soviet Union, shipping nearly four million tons of cargo through
the Barents Sea and nearly five hundred thousand tons through the Bering Strait
during the war.12 German forces, also recognizing the strategic value of the High
North, established naval and air bases in Norway after their successful invasion
in April 1940.
Alaska’s strategic value prompted the construction of the Alaska-Canadian
Highway and other significant infrastructure projects during World War II. The
war made an enormous impact on Alaska’s population; thousands of people
moved north to support the war effort, and many remained afterward. By 1945,
the military population had skyrocketed to nearly sixty thousand, from around
five hundred in 1940.13 Alaska’s total population in 1950 was nearly double its
1940 population of 129,000.14 The military expansion in Alaska during World
War II, which was extended by the onset of the Cold War, fueled the state’s economic growth; by 1955, uniformed military personnel made up nearly a quarter
of the population, and as much as 80 percent of Alaskan employment was related
to the defense industry.15
During the Cold War, Alaska was key to implementing a so-called damagelimitation strategy to deter a potential Soviet nuclear attack against the United
States. In theory, under such strategies nuclear attacks are deterred by providing
the capability to limit the damage they could wreak sufficiently to render them
strategically pointless. This would be achieved by providing an air defense robust
enough to destroy a substantial portion of Soviet nuclear bombers and missiles
before they reached the continental United States (CONUS). Alaska was (and
remains) ideally situated to provide early warning of attacks against the United
States from the Soviet Union (and Russia today) because the shortest air routes
between the two countries cut across the Arctic Ocean. (It is instructive to reinforce this fact using a globe or by looking at a polar projection instead of the standard Mercator one.) Once the Arctic was deemed vulnerable to Soviet nuclear
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss3/4
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bombers, the Distant Early Warning (i.e., DEW) Line—consisting of more than
fifty radar and communication stations stretched across three thousand miles—
was established to allow the Strategic Air Command (SAC) to respond appropriately to any threat.16
In 1957, the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD)—a combined
U.S.-Canadian defense organization—assumed responsibility for continental air
defense, focusing on Soviet threats from the polar region. Technological developments shifted the focus of defense efforts from bomber attacks toward ICBM
threats. Alaska hosted one of NORAD’s first ballistic-missile early-warning stations, designed to provide approximately fifteen minutes’ warning of a missile
attack against CONUS. The U.S. Arctic region became strategically critical for
identifying inbound Soviet bombers and missiles and providing an opportunity
for defense in depth against nuclear attack.
U.S. naval leadership in exploring the Arctic again became global news when
Nautilus completed its record-breaking voyage, becoming the first submarine to
circumnavigate the globe under the polar ice cap. On 3 August 1958, the boat’s
captain, Commander William R. Anderson, USN, addressed his crewmembers
at the historic moment they reached the North Pole: “For the world, our country, and the Navy—the North Pole.” Once Nautilus was clear of the ice pack, the
message “Nautilus 90 North” was relayed in Morse code to President Dwight
D. Eisenhower via a Navy radio station in Hawaii. This demonstration by the
nuclear-powered submarine made it clear that extensive under-ice operations
were possible. Indeed, as Commander Robert D. McWethy, USN, one of the
Navy’s early advocates for the value of submarine operations in the Arctic to
monitor the Soviet Union, noted in 1958, “The ice pack in the Arctic Ocean
region lends itself to exploitation by submarine.”17 Commander Anderson later
would envision the maritime shipping potential of the region, considering the
shorter maritime route connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. However,
he did not anticipate a thawing Arctic, instead predicting a future in which
cargo-laden submarines shipped goods along the Arctic route.18 Like many
Arctic endeavors, his vision of submarine cargo vessels never was realized in
a region that continually proves to be important strategically but challenging
operationally.
Nautilus’s notable achievement of sailing successfully under the ice cap elicited
great pride from Americans at the height of the Cold War—especially since the
Soviets were pulling ahead in the space race. Its accomplishment highlighted
American naval ingenuity and demonstrated to the Soviets that American submarines could operate in their icy back yard. In 1959, USS Skate (SSN 578) sailed
north with the mission of breaking through the thick polar ice. Skate’s captain,
Commander James F. Calvert, reflecting on the perilous task, claimed that his
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2022
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crewmembers were “immune to fear and desperation” as a result of their training
and their trust in one another.19 Nautilus’s and Skate’s polar successes built on
American inventor Simon Lake’s early efforts to develop submarines capable of
“navigating in water covered by surface ice.” Indeed, the Lake-designed submarine Protector became the first submarine to cruise under, and to surface through,
sea ice, in 1903, off the coast of Newport, Rhode Island.20 The submarine’s success
attracted attention, and five years later, in 1908, the Lake-designed submarine Kefal, built for tsarist Russia, became the first Russian submarine to surface through
ice, near Vladivostok.21
The Arctic saw a dramatic increase in military operations during the Cold
War, primarily conducted by submarines. Soviet and U.S. submarine activity during the Cold War was robust, although details largely remain classified. U.S. submarines were tasked with tracking Soviet missile submarines from their northern
bases on the Kola Peninsula east of Finland into Arctic waters, whose ice cover
provided exceptional shelter from detection. The Arctic remained a critical strategic region throughout the Cold War, including playing a part in President
Richard M. Nixon’s “madman theory” of deterrence. This theory originated with
the nuclear brinkmanship practiced by President Eisenhower and was designed
to sow doubt regarding the degree of irrationality and volatility that should be
attributed to the United States. The intent was to diminish a potential Soviet
provocation by raising the possibility of a stronger U.S. retaliation than Soviet
leaders expected. To demonstrate both capability and unpredictability, SAC flew
nuclear-armed airborne-alert flights over the Arctic Circle.22
In December 1971, Henry A. Kissinger, then assistant to the president for national security affairs (i.e., national security advisor) under Nixon, promulgated
a national security decision memorandum on U.S. Arctic policy. The memorandum stated that “the President has decided that the United States will support
the sound and rational development of the Arctic, guided by the principle of
minimizing any adverse effects to the environment; will promote mutually beneficial international cooperation in the Arctic; and will at the same time provide
for the protection of essential security interests in the Arctic.”23 It further stated
that these security interests included preservation of the principle of freedom of
the seas and of airspace. The strategic importance of the Arctic region—primarily
owing to the potential flight paths of strategic bombers and ICBMs—finally had
warranted issuance of a defined U.S. Arctic policy. Yet the policy also reflected
the growing understanding that the region was important for more than just
strategic defense. Concern for environmental issues in the Arctic prompted the
1973 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears among the United States,
the Soviet Union, Norway, Denmark, and Canada. Thus, scientific cooperation in
the region continued despite ongoing strategic tensions.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss3/4
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The Arctic, in fact, long has seen the juxtaposition of cooperation and
competition. Following Nixon’s efforts in the region, national attention
largely turned elsewhere, although the Arctic remained strategically vital for
early warning of ICBM threats. Then, in the 1980s, the Reagan administration
redoubled American efforts to attain a strategic advantage over the Soviet
Union, particularly in the maritime domain. The Maritime Strategy charted a
bold new course for the Navy. Secretary of the Navy Lehman and Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) Admiral James D. Watkins, USN, proposed an innovative forward global strategy, in which
the Arctic played a small but
Russia’s Arctic border . . . traditionally was
considered impenetrable to invasion, but now important role. With contrithe opening of the Arctic heightens the sense of butions from brilliant strategists such as Captain Peter M.
paranoia that characterizes Russia’s views
Swartz, USN (now retired),
about potential invasions and has led to inthe strategy was designed and
creased militarization in the region.
implemented to demonstrate
to the Soviet Union that the U.S. Navy and allied forces had the ability to defeat
the Soviet navy in a potential conflict and strike hard into the Soviet homeland—
namely, the Soviets’ strategic bastions in the High North. Improving the Navy’s
ability to operate in the difficult region was critical to pressing the Soviets and
deterring aggression through a cost-imposing strategy. This approach helped
lead to the ultimate downfall of the Soviet Union.
This concept led to Exercise O CEAN VENTURE in August–October 1981,
which brought together from fifteen nations about 120,000 personnel, 250
ships, and a thousand aircraft. The Navy exercised offensive and sea-control
operations north of the Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom gap—through
which Arctic-based Soviet fleets and ballistic-missile submarines would have
to pass to break out into the North Atlantic to threaten NATO forces. Sustained operations in these frigid waters posed significant challenges to the
naval forces, with sailors confronting reduced visibility, subzero temperatures,
dangerous icing conditions, and freezing of equipment. These challenges complicated war fighting and made it more difficult for participating ships and
aircraft to fulfill their missions. Using innovative tactics to overcome both the
Arctic conditions and the challenges embedded in the exercise scenario, the
fleet succeeded in sailing to within striking distance of Murmansk—the heart
of the Soviet strategic-submarine fleet. Although the U.S. fleet had operated
in the Arctic before, the principles of the developing strategy called for allied
surface ships to operate in northern latitudes more frequently to balance the
routine presence there of Soviet naval forces.24 Doing so would force Soviet
planners to reconsider their own force deployments to ensure they had enough
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2022
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assets available to protect their strategic bastions, which was vital to the costimposition strategy.
As the new strategy expanded the priority of Arctic naval operations, the
Assistant Deputy CNO for Surface Warfare observed in 1985 that the Navy’s
“limited operations in the Arctic have revealed a number of problems that
must be overcome if we are to successfully send our ships into these waters
on a routine basis.”25 Therefore the Navy established an Arctic / Cold Weather
Program for Surface Ships to provide the fleet with instructions and hardware
to operate effectively in the northernmost latitudes. The 1988 U.S. Navy Cold
Weather Handbook for Surface Ships was published to establish procedures
for Arctic operations; it provided guidance on everything from Arctic meteorological conditions to maneuvering in sea ice. It even noted the importance
of ensuring excellent dental health prior to cold-weather operations, lest the
thermal stresses on teeth from drinking hot coffee after being outside cause
cracking!26
While the Navy’s surface community was improving its ability to operate in the
challenging Arctic region, underneath the seas its submarines remained dominant. During the Cold War, the Arctic quickly became a submarine playground,
with the Russians deploying their ballistic-missile submarines into protected
launch bastions in the High North.27 To operate in or close to Russia’s Arctic submarine bastions, the United States needed attack submarines that could operate
effectively under the ice pack while eluding detection themselves. This required
a significant investment in both infrastructure and training. The Sturgeon-class
submarines were designed for the Arctic environment, with systems capable of
prolonged operation in extreme cold, top and bottom sounders to enable navigation under the ice, and a hardened sail that worked as an “ice pick” to allow the
boat to break through ice.
Crews that deployed in the Arctic Ocean and High North underwent months
of predeployment training, and the submarines were assigned civilian ice pilots with significant experience navigating those waters. The training included
theoretical, scientific, and practical exercises that introduced crews who were
accustomed to much warmer waters to the idiosyncrasies of the general Arctic
environment, such as differences in temperature and salinity—and the nearconstant presence of bearded seals, whose moans could be heard through the
hull and in the sonar.
For example, changes in salinity were not to be taken lightly on platforms
that approached eight thousand tons submerged. A submarine’s neutral buoyancy is obtained by trimming the ship and loading or pumping off seawater
ballast from trim tanks to maintain the diving officer’s ever-elusive “zero
bubble,” or optimal trim. However, as a submarine approaches areas of melting
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss3/4
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ice (which produces fresh water), the density of the ocean water changes, so
buoyancy does as well. In such waters, watch teams had to be (and still must
be) alert at all times and take quick action to avoid a sudden “depth excursion.”
Keeping track of such environmental factors is essential to safe operation in the
Arctic environment.
Likewise, sailors became proficient in wearing cold-weather gear and avoiding the perils of frostbite and hypothermia when exposed to Arctic conditions,
whether on the bridge or out exploring on the ice. Commercial hunting ammunition was provided to personnel to defend themselves against any rogue polar
bears or arctic foxes; the latter often suffered from rabies, which made their
behavior erratic and unpredictable.
Operating a submarine in the open ocean is challenging enough for a welltrained crew, but in the Arctic crews did so in an environment in which the
hazards above them when submerged were not limited to adversary aircraft and
surface ships. Floating icebergs pose a danger owing to the considerable depth
to which they extend beneath the surface. Additionally, surface ice can come in
the form of either multiyear or first-year ice; the latter tends to be less difficult to
break through. As part of the seasonal ice zone, the marginal ice zone, extending
from the ice edge into the ice pack, varies in width from sixty to 120 miles.28 Simply put, ice is variable, and the uncertainties involved pose significant operational
challenges to vessels operating both above and below the ice, requiring frequent
updating of procedures. For instance, in temperate climates a submarine can
refresh its air by raising its snorkel mast and ventilating, but this is problematic
when there is pack ice overhead. In sum, standard operating procedures were
no longer “standard” under the ice, so submariners had to find new ways to do
normal things.
Navigation in the Arctic proved challenging as well. Magnetic compasses are
useless at the polar ice cap, as crews discovered during the Cold War. Before
GPS, existing radio-navigation systems used to obtain a ship’s position, such as
LORAN-C and Omega, were unavailable in the Arctic. Even the service’s pioneering Navy Navigation Satellite System (known as NAVSAT) was unreliable
in high latitudes, despite relying on satellites. These limitations resulted in the
navigator’s best friend becoming the Mk 19 gyrocompass; a warship’s navigator
and quartermasters would monitor the Mk 19 carefully as the boat approached
the pole, hoping that the gyro did not tumble and lose its ability to provide a
direction for the ship’s track.
Sailors faced many challenges to operating in the Arctic back then, more so
than they do when operating up north today. But our Navy was innovative and
determined, and the Soviet Union could not help but take note. Therefore, to
protect their Arctic submarine bastions, the Soviets sought to build stealthier and
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2022
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Members of the wardroom of USS Sea Devil (SSN 664) surfaced through the Arctic sea ice in 1985.

more-capable submarines to counter the threat of American fast-attack submarines in their back yard.
Although the Navy became proficient at operating in the High North even on
the surface, the end of the Cold War left the Arctic largely to those operating in
the undersea domain. The figure shows the members of the wardroom of USS
Sea Devil (SSN 664) when the boat was surfaced in a polynya—an opening in the
sea ice—on the first visit of one of the authors to the polar region. Fifteen years
after the author’s first voyage to the High North, his second deployment, for
LANTSUBICEX 2001, was less stressful. Training was about the same and an
ice pilot was assigned to ensure safe Arctic operations. However, it was remarkable how much less ice there was in both the marginal ice zone and within the
traditional demarcation of the pack-ice zone. Similarly, much to the author’s
chagrin, man-made pollution, particularly in the form of plastics, was much
more noticeable—a disconcerting shock amid the serene, azure-blue waters of
the Arctic.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss3/4
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THE ARCTIC TODAY
The Arctic now resides at the intersection of rapidly evolving geopolitical,
economic, climate, and security trends. Although the world’s polar sailors long
characterized the region with the adage “High North, low tension,” today’s era of
competition is casting doubt on the continued applicability of this catchphrase;
instead, the Arctic is being catapulted into key security discussions. With just
about four million inhabitants, the Arctic region accounts for only a small fraction of the global population, but its strategic location and economic potential
and the stakeholders involved mean it has a disproportionate impact on global
security. Despite including the world’s smallest ocean, the Arctic region has the
potential to connect nearly 90 percent of the world’s economy.29 What happens in
the Arctic will not stay there. Melting Arctic ice is causing significant worldwide
changes, particularly in sea level / depth and salinity. The fragile Arctic ecosystem is changing as temperatures rise, bringing new fishing stocks north even as
some regional flora and fauna face endangerment. Climate and technological
trends are enabling greater access to abundant natural resources while also having a profound impact on human and military security. Geopolitical trends are
shaping the region further, in such a way that the Arctic no longer will remain an
isolated region of cooperation; some states will engage in competitive strategies
to maximize their national interests.
Russia
Russia has pursued an aggressive strategy in the Arctic. About half the Arctic
coastline and Arctic population lie within Russia’s borders, and the country is
increasingly reliant on the Arctic for economic benefits, from which it derives
about 10 percent of its gross domestic product and 20 percent of its exports.30
Russia established a joint strategic command (somewhat similar to the U.S.
geographic combatant commands, but with boundaries aligned to Russian territory) for the Arctic in 2014, has refurbished old Soviet-era military bases, and
has built fourteen new airfields and sixteen deepwater ports in the region.31
Russia has modernized both the Northern Fleet and its Arctic naval bases and
has shifted additional military assets to the region, bringing the share of the
country’s modern weapons, military, and special equipment in the Arctic zone
from 41 percent in 2014 to 59 percent in 2019.32 The Northern Fleet remains
Russia’s principal entity responsible for strategic deterrence, and it is committed
to protecting the Arctic bastions to ensure it retains a credible retaliatory capability. Alongside Russia’s established defensive capabilities, which include the
advanced S-400 missile system, the country also is pursuing more-disconcerting
offensive capabilities, as demonstrated by its stated intent to station the first
squadron of nuclear-capable Kinzhal-missile-equipped MiG-31K fighters on
the Kola Peninsula.33
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Russia also has invested heavily in infrastructure, including building more than
forty icebreakers to service its Arctic ports and towns, nearly a dozen of which
are nuclear powered. The naval icebreaker Ivan Papanin—equipped to carry the
highly capable Kalibr antiship cruise missile—was launched in October 2019 to
much fanfare, which noted the ship’s multiple roles as a tug, icebreaker, and patrol
vessel.34 These icebreakers will
Russia’s aggressive actions elsewhere—particu- be employed heavily along the
Northern Sea Route, which
larly in Ukraine—and its clear prioritization
connects Asia and Europe
of dominating the Arctic compel the United
across Russia’s northern borStates to ensure its capability to counter Rusder. Russia claims that the exsia in any domain.
tent of its exclusive economic
zone includes all the waters of the Northern Sea Route; even further, it considers
the entire route to fall within its historic internal waters. Relying on article 234 of
the 1984 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (known as UNCLOS),
it justifies setting rules and regulations for the route—an exercise of authority that
the United States and other nations do not recognize.35 Russia promotes the route as
a shorter alternative to the traditional commercial sea route that goes through the
Suez Canal and Strait of Malacca, although treacherous weather and sea conditions
and water-depth limitations diminish the northern route’s attractiveness. Work
along the route has provided Russia’s commercial and naval fleets extensive Arctic
operational experience.
As of 1 January 2021, Russia elevated the Northern Fleet to constitute its own
military district, the first time a fleet has held status equal to that of the existing
four predominantly land-focused military districts (designated West, South, East,
and Central).36 Military districts provide administrative and operational headquarters for Russian armed forces. The new district is tasked with ensuring Russian interests and territorial integrity in the Arctic, including Russia’s Arctic coast
and the Northern Sea Route. Admiral Aleksandr A. Moiseyev, Russia’s Northern
Fleet commander, noted that the joint strategic exercise ZAPAD, held annually in
a different military district, most recently in September 2021, will continue to
serve as the fleet’s main training effort.37 Russia’s prioritization of the Northern
Fleet indicates that in the High North the Russian navy will have the primary
responsibility for upholding Russian interests, in contrast to the prioritization
that ground forces receive in the rest of the nation.
China
Russia is striving to hold on to its commanding position in the Arctic domain, but
China is increasingly active in the region. The latter country long has maintained
a research station on Svalbard, and increasingly it has invested in Arctic maritime
capabilities, including building two icebreakers and making plans for additional
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss3/4
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icebreaking capability. China’s interest in the Arctic has been rising for years; its
January 2018 Arctic policy white paper introduces China as a near Arctic state—
an undefined term—and makes it clear that China intends to pursue interests in
the region, including adding to its Belt and Road Initiative a “Polar Silk Road”
component, as a northern route to European markets.38
Western sanctions against Russia for its annexation of Crimea in 2014 have
motivated increased cooperation between China and Russia in the Arctic, including significant Chinese investment in Russia’s Yamal Liquefied Natural Gas joint
venture. The Chinese drilling rig Nan Hai VIII (also known as Nan Hai Ba Hao),
in partnership with Gazprom (Russia’s state-owned energy corporation), has
explored fields in the Kara Sea, discovering some of the region’s largest gas fields.
To bring liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the Yamal terminal, the Christophe de
Margerie–class icebreaking LNG carriers were constructed at South Korea’s Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering in a joint venture among Sovcomflot
(Russia’s largest shipping company), Teekay Tankers of Bermuda (in partnership
with China LNG Shipping), the Greek concern Dynagas, and Mitsui OSK Lines
of Japan (in partnership with China Shipping Group).39
China has invested in infrastructure throughout the Arctic, with particular
attention to natural resources and Arctic infrastructure. China has demonstrated special interest in the shipping potential of the region, sending a small
number of commercial vessels through the Northern Sea Route each year,
including fourteen in 2021, according to Russia’s Northern Sea Route Administration. A three-month expedition in the summer of 2021 by the indigenously
built Chinese icebreaker Xue Long 2 marked China’s twelfth Arctic deployment
for scientific research, and provided China ample additional opportunity to
study the region’s characteristics to guide future civilian and military pursuits
in the Arctic.40
Skepticism from Others
Although Russia and China are pursuing ambitious plans in the Arctic, the
difficulties of operating in the region have tempered global commercial interest. While President Putin set a goal of 80 million tons of shipping through the
Northern Sea Route by 2024, 2021 saw just 35 million tons. So far, shipments predominantly consist of natural resources heading to Asian and European markets
rather than transit shipping of cargo, which totaled just 1.5 million tons in 2021
(compared with more than a billion tons through the Suez Canal).41
Yet there is no doubt that the thawing ice will continue to have effects. As new
shipping corridors become more viable, maritime traffic increasingly will be
drawn to the region. Fishing stocks will continue to move northward, and other
natural resources will be explored.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2022

15

Naval War College Review, Vol. 75 [2022], No. 3, Art. 4

FOGGO & GOSNELL

27

THE OPENING ARCTIC IS A MARITIME DOMAIN
U.S. strategic interests in the Arctic—including economic, military, and geopolitical—will increase as regional activity rises. The U.S. Navy must be prepared to
uphold national interests, demonstrate credible presence, and ensure freedom of
navigation through the region. As the Arctic Ocean opens, strategic competition
for regional sea control will increase. The Navy must be ready.
The Department of the Navy will continue to fulfill a critical role in the Arctic
efforts of the Department of Defense. With their newly released Arctic Blueprint,
the Navy and Marine Corps have taken a forward-leaning approach to improving regional presence, partnerships, and capabilities.42 The U.S. Navy needs to
build on the lessons of the past to provide insights on how to compete more effectively in the High North, uphold international norms, and prepare to counter
the increasingly aggressive polar ambitions of Russia and China. And it must
prepare to defend American economic and strategic interests even more directly,
if necessary.
Although not yet “full speed ahead” in the Arctic, the Navy clearly is learning.
Inspired by the 1981 Exercise OCEAN VENTURE, Exercise TRIDENT JUNCTURE
2018 provided significant learning opportunities, as more than fifty thousand
sailors, soldiers, airmen, and Marines on nearly seventy warships, 250 aircraft,
and ten thousand tracked or rolling vehicles, including assets from every NATO
ally and two partner nations, conducted an article 5 collective-defense scenario
in Norway and nearby Arctic waters.43
The exercise, which was enabled by Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis’s
“dynamic force employment” concept that sent the Truman carrier strike group
north, was highly successful, but it also demonstrated the need to sharpen skill sets
for those contending with harsh northern environments. No U.S. aircraft carrier
had operated in the Arctic in nearly three decades. The weather was challenging,
so aircraft were launching at the margins of permissible conditions: twelve-toeighteen-foot seas and high winds. Yet sailors on board were innovative and found
creative solutions to problems. When CNO Admiral John M. Richardson embarked in USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75), he noticed Louisville Slugger baseball
bats lined up in a passageway; curious, he inquired what they were for. One of the
enterprising sailors explained that the bats were critically necessary—for breaking
ice off the deck.44 But while TRIDENT JUNCTURE demonstrated the ingenuity of
USN forces, it also revealed the complexity of Arctic operations. As USS Gunston
Hall (LSD 44) transited through heavy seas from Iceland to Norway, the ship
sustained damage to its well deck and several sailors were injured; instead of completing the exercise, Gunston Hall returned to Reykjavík and subsequently to the
United States, escorted by USS New York (LPD 21) as a precautionary measure.45
Aboard Truman, Rear Admiral Eugene H. Black III, the strike group commander,
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss3/4
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noted the key lesson learned: “You’ve got to be agile.”46 The experience reinforced
that extremely cold temperatures, frequent icing conditions, high sea states, unpredictable weather patterns, limited daylight, and greater distances to ports and
emergency divert fields make even basic operations more dangerous in the Arctic
than elsewhere.
The U.S. Navy must do more to remain competitive in the Arctic, given that
Russia has maintained a clear focus on achieving dominance in a region that is strategically located but incredibly difficult to operate in—for both sides. Hostile environmental conditions demand updated operational procedures, cold-weathertested gear, and special training to ensure not only war-fighting proficiency but
survival.
Russia has been improving its military capabilities and adding bases in the
region. In late April 2020, Russian paratroopers demonstrated operational proficiency in the challenging environment as they jumped out of an Il-76 transport
plane at a height of ten thousand meters above the Eastern Hemisphere’s northernmost archipelago, Russia’s Franz Josef Land, then conducted three days of
combat-training missions on Aleksandra Land, one of the archipelago’s largest
islands. There, at 80 degrees north latitude, Russia’s Arctic forces have expanded
Soviet-era Arctic infrastructure and built the world’s northernmost military
complex. The expansion of the Nagurskoye air base was designed to better secure approaches to the Russian coastline, protect natural resources, and improve
monitoring of Northern Sea Route traffic. The base includes a new 2,500-meter
runway.47 It also is home to an S-300 antiaircraft missile system, as well as to
troops equipped for Arctic warfare with snowmobiles, helicopters, radar systems,
and unmanned aerial vehicles designed for the harsh environment.48 General
Valery V. Gerasimov, Russia’s chief of general staff, has noted that the airport also
can host the new hypersonic Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile.49 The operating range of the missile is reported to be more than a thousand miles, which
means it can hold many European capitals at risk with either a conventional or
a nuclear-armed warhead.50 Indeed, Russia carefully is constructing a series of
bases in the region to ensure its coverage of the country’s northern flank as well
as the international waters of the Northern Sea Route.
While there is no issue with an independent state enacting defensive measures
to protect its sovereignty, Russia’s buildup includes offensive capabilities that
could hold not only the United States but also its regional allies and partners at
risk. Russia’s aggressive actions elsewhere—particularly in Ukraine—and its clear
prioritization of dominating the Arctic compel the United States to ensure its
capability to counter Russia in any domain.
In May 2020, a couple of weeks after Russia’s April 2020 exercise, a surface action group (SAG) of four USN warships and a British Royal Navy frigate patrolled
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the Barents Sea, the first such combined patrol since the Cold War. This was
meant to signal to the Russians that—as one of the authors explained, in his capacity as commander of U.S.
naval forces in Europe—the
The learning curve for Arctic operations is
Arctic was “nobody’s lake.”51
steep; mistakes can be costly. . . . [T]he U.S.
Navy [must] prepare now to be able to operate He went on to warn Russia
and China that access to the
in a region that is increasingly important; to
Arctic should be free and fair.
do so, the service must draw on the lessons of
The Barents Sea SAG disthe past.
played the strengthening U.S.
commitment to operating in the Arctic, and USN warships operated in the Arctic
consistently from May to November 2020.
NATO’s Exercise TRIDENT JUNCTURE and other USN and U.S. Marine Corps
exercises in the region have improved the services’ capabilities to operate in arduous conditions while demonstrating the need to build further on those foundations. The complexity involved in conducting military exercises in the region is
increasing as other Arctic states prepare to protect their interests against potential
security challenges.
During UMKA-21 in March 2021, Russia coordinated a first-ever surfacing of
three ballistic-missile submarines within three hundred meters of one another
off Aleksandra Land in the Franz Josef Land archipelago. The submarines carried a combined forty-eight ballistic missiles. Given the complexity and dangers
of operating in such an environment, the simultaneous surfacing demonstrated
a high level of crew training.52 The exercise—Russia’s most advanced military
drill in the Arctic yet—included forty-three events that took place at Franz Josef
Land and in nearby waters. Admiral Nikolay A. Yevmenov, commander of the
Russian navy, announced that “[u]nder the leadership of the Headquarters of
the Navy, the integrated Arctic expedition UMKA-2021 is being conducted. For
the first time, in accordance with a single concept and plan, complex combat
training, research, and practical measures of various directions is carried out in
the circumpolar region.”53
Since the region is attracting increasing global interest from states and corporations alike, the Navy must prepare to uphold U.S. strategic interests in the region,
particularly protecting the homeland and ensuring freedom of navigation. While
Russia long has been the most formidable Arctic state with which the United States
and like-minded allies have contended, there is increasing alarm over China’s keen
desire to be present in the Arctic. China’s issuance of its 2018 Arctic white paper,
participation in Arctic forums, conduct of scientific research, and investment in
the High North have demonstrated a firm commitment to exploring the region’s
economic potential. Scientific research conducted from its Svalbard research
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss3/4
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station and during icebreaker deployments yields data that will benefit both its
commercial and military ambitions in the region.54 The Arctic deployment of China’s indigenously built (though Finnish-designed) icebreaker Xue Long 2 in July
2020 marked China’s eleventh Arctic research expedition. It covered more than
twelve thousand nautical miles and conducted hydrographic surveys and mapping
of the ocean bottom—dual-use research that could signify preparation either to
conduct natural-resource exploration or send Chinese submarines north.55
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
Mariners throughout history have attested to the immense difficulty of operating in far-northern latitudes. The learning curve for Arctic operations is steep;
mistakes can be costly. It is imperative that the U.S. Navy prepare now to be able
to operate in a region that is increasingly important; to do so, the service must
draw on the lessons of the past.
The Navy Department’s January 2021 Arctic Blueprint offers a thoughtful
strategic approach to the region, and if the Navy and Marine Corps achieve the
goals it lays out they will be positioned well for a thawing Arctic. The publication
establishes three primary objectives: maintain enhanced presence, strengthen
cooperative partnerships, and build a more capable naval force.56 The strategy
provides a broad overview of each objective, and the relevant recommendations
are both sound and necessary; the authors will not repeat them here.
However, there are key areas on which naval forces should focus in the Arctic,
and as the strategy is implemented we must continue to do so if we are to achieve
the stated objectives fully. Our survey of the Navy’s history in the Arctic suggests
six areas of focus for naval forces today as they prepare to meet growing operational demands in the region.
Prepare for the Cold. The history of the Arctic is replete with stories of the devastating effects of the region’s notoriously harsh environment. Although the ice is
diminishing, the Arctic remains hostile. Sailors must prepare for intense cold—
dropping to minus forty degrees Celsius in winter—that hinders the functionality
of machinery and poses dangers to personnel.
The increasingly open waters of the Arctic have amplified the unpredictability of ice floes; the rapid melting of one-year ice can cause large blocks of
thicker multiyear ice to flow into sea-lanes, with conditions varying seasonally.
Furthermore, weather conditions compound the challenges posed by ice, as severe storms often further hinder transits. In the summer, heavy fog is common,
obscuring visibility and requiring vessels to slow down to avoid colliding with
unexpected ice and one another.57
The nearly four decades that have elapsed since the Navy published its Cold
Weather Handbook for Surface Ships have seen extraordinary and rapid changes
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to the Arctic environment and dramatic advances in maritime and cold-weather
technology, and there has been a significant evolution in naval operations and
procedures since the Cold War. These developments demand a comprehensive
update to the handbook so that naval forces can invest in the right gear and
focus their training to enable successful cold-weather operations.
Innovate. Early Arctic explorers were known for their resilience and innovation.
When something went wrong—which it often did—the most successful explorers
relied on their training and knowledge to apply or invent effective solutions. As
Commander Calvert of USS Skate noted, to succeed in the harsh Arctic environment it is essential for crewmembers to have both the appropriate training and
trust in one another.
The Navy should enhance support of similar innovation by sailors operating
in the High North via enhanced training and professional military education opportunities. It also should reward innovators—including by forgiving mistakes
made in the course of innovations attempted in good faith.
Everyone Is a Scientist. Intrepid naval officers who first explored the Arctic quickly realized the importance of understanding better the environment in which
they were operating; early journal articles on the region are filled with scientific
findings developed from naval voyages. Yet the Arctic remains one of the least
understood regions of the world.
To improve understanding of the Arctic’s meteorological and hydrographic
conditions, all Navy assets operating in the region should collect data, just as
Nautilus and Skate did on their early voyages to the North Pole. Embarking Naval
Meteorology and Oceanography Command (referred to as METOC) detachments on Arctic-bound vessels would help to ensure rigorous observation of the
Arctic environment. Data collected should be compiled into carefully managed
databases, both to preserve historical records and to enable trend analyses to
inform units operating in the region in the future.
Enhance Presence. As strategic competition among great powers intensifies, the
Navy must protect national interests, reassure allies and partners, and provide a
credible deterrence. Operations in the High North should be coordinated with
allies and partners to achieve these goals. In particular, the U.S. Navy can learn
from countries such as Norway and Denmark, which have the expertise that
comes from centuries of Arctic maritime experience. Allies such as the United
Kingdom will continue to sail alongside the United States into the frigid Arctic
waters, and enhancing our exercises in the region will continue to improve our
collective ability to operate there.
Key Arctic enabling capabilities such as icebreakers are “high-demand, lowdensity” assets, so the Navy must seek creative solutions, including by training
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss3/4
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crews of surface ships and providing the technology necessary for them to operate their vessels safely while sailing in icy Arctic waters. The Danes and Norwegians have proved that non-ice-strengthened ships can operate safely in the
region. Leasing civilian icebreaking assets could be considered to fill gaps until
the U.S. Coast Guard’s new polar security cutters are operational; delivery of the
first new U.S. heavy icebreaker has slipped to 2025.58 Creative options, such as a
combination of manned and unmanned platforms, can enhance the American
presence in the Arctic further.
Allies and Partners Matter. Early Arctic expeditions were known for their reliance on indigenous partners, owing to the latter’s knowledge and understanding of the region’s challenging environment. Just as Rear Admiral Peary relied
on Inuit expertise during his successful mission to the North Pole, today’s Navy
should increase exercises, operations, and personnel exchanges with Arctic allies and partners to enhance understanding of regional operations while building
interoperability.
Cooperation Is Essential. The arduous environmental conditions of the Arctic
long have made operations in the region conducive to cooperation. Whether
sharing data from scientific missions or conducting SAR operations, mariners in
the High North long have worked together to survive. Even among states engaged
in great-power competition, it is necessary to build on cooperative mechanisms
that can enhance transparency and reduce the potential for misunderstanding or
misperception.
The U.S. Navy has an impressive history of operating in the Arctic. Admiral
Peary, Admiral Byrd, and Captain Anderson achieved significant Arctic milestones, but their successes were enabled by the contributions of sailors such
as Commander Henry Glass and Lieutenant Danenhower, who meticulously
documented Arctic conditions during earlier Arctic expeditions. Given the
complexities of today’s dynamic strategic environment, it is imperative that the
Navy be prepared to operate in any domain—even the harshest region in the
world.
The opening of the Arctic Ocean and the increasing interest in the High North
by Arctic and non-Arctic states alike demand the application of past lessons to
enhance operations in the future. To secure America’s long-term strategic interests while supporting the broader goal of collective defense among allies and
partners, it is critical for the Navy to examine the lessons from its Arctic history
and apply them to ensure maritime superiority.
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